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Most courses in information security do not provide students with practical experience in 
high assurance development. To complement a course in secure systems that focuses on 
foundational principles of constructive security, a laboratory project that requires students to 
work in teams while meeting Common Criteria Evaluation Assurance Level (EAL) 6 
assurance requirements has been created. The objectives, structure, and experience with this 
laboratory project are described. 
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1. Introduction 
Introductory computer security courses often review such a broad range of concepts and 
mechanisms that students are unable to delve into the subtleties of secure system 
development.  Even when advanced courses in computer security are offered, lectures and 
readings can eclipse laboratory work and projects. We have developed a course in secure 
systems that covers the foundational principles of high assurance secure system development.  
Although the course encompasses a very substantial amount of lecture and reading material 
regarding secure system development, laboratory activity is considered to be an essential to 
the learning process.  To reinforce the ideas presented in the abstract and to give students a 
small amount of concrete experience in secure system development, we have created a 
unique Common Criteria-based laboratory project. 
This paper is intended to describe the context of the advanced class in secure systems as 
well as its current laboratory activities.  To this end, the history of laboratory work in the 
class will be reviewed and then the objectives of and observations regarding the current 
project will be presented. 
1.1 Context of the Course  
The Computer Science Department at the Naval Postgraduate School offers a broadly-
based program in information and software assurance. The current set of classes offered in 
system security and assurance are described in Table 1. Of this set, the first course, entitled 
Introduction to Information Assurance: Computer Security, is both a prerequisite to all 
subsequent offerings as well as a requirement for all students campus-wide in programs 
related to the information sciences and information technology. The university is on the 
quarter system and each quarter lasts eleven weeks, thus all courses are eleven weeks in 
duration. 
Table 1. Courses in Information and Software Assurance 
Course Title Hours* Description 
Introduction to 
Information Assurance: 
Computer Security   
(core requirement) 
4-2 This is a comprehensive overview of the terminology, concepts, 
issues, policies, and technologies associated with the fields of 
Information and Software Assurance. It is a prerequisite for all other 
Computer Security Track courses. 
 
Analysis of Government 
Critical Infrastructure 
Protection 
3-1 A government-formulated CIP lifecycle is introduced, that includes: 
Analysis & Assessment, Remediation, Indicators & Warnings, 
Mitigation, Incident Response, and Reconstitution. Assessment of 




Secure Management of 
Systems                    
(track requirement) 
3-2 A security manager’s view of the diverse management concerns 
associated with administering and operating an automated 
information system facility with minimized risk is presented. 
Students examine both the technical and non-technical security 




3-2 The potential vulnerabilities in networked systems are taught by 
studying methods to:  obtain information about a remote network 
and to possibly exploit or subvert systems on that network. Labs 
provide practical experience with current network attack and 
vulnerability assessment tools.  
 
Network Security    
(track requirement) 
4-2 This course covers the concepts and technologies used to achieve 
confidentiality, integrity, and authenticity for information processed 
across networks.  
 
Secure Systems        
(track requirement) 
3-2 The implementation of protection for individual and networked 
secure computer systems is covered. The problems of subversion 
and confinement in highly secure components are addressed by 
coherent mechanisms and lifecycle assurance methodologies.  
 
Database Security 3-1 Course topics include: policies for information integrity and 
confidentiality of database (DB) systems, modeling of secure DB 
systems, security in statistical and object-oriented DBs, multi-tier 
architecture security issues, privacy, aggregation and inference, and 
applications of secure DBs. 
 
Security Policies, 
Models, and Formal 
Methods                  
(track requirement) 
3-1 The methods used to specify, model and verify the access control 
mechanisms of computational systems are presented. The 
identification of the security policy and its interpretation in terms of 
a technical policy is covered. Several security policy and access-
control models are explored. 
  
Mobile and Wireless 
Security 
3 This course addresses the security functionality, protocol and 
assurance issues associated with this emerging technology. 
 
Computer Forensics 3-2 This course covers the fundamentals of computer forensics in the 
context of government information operations. Students examine 
how information is stored and how it may be deliberately hidden 




3-2 This course provides an introduction to the Certification and 
Accreditation (C&A) process as applied to the procurement and 
Course Title Hours* Description 
Accreditation lifecycle management of government information systems.  
 
Advanced Topics in 
Computer Security 
3-1 Advanced topics in software, communications, and information 
security are covered. Information security policies are studied, along 
with issues involving existing and emerging IA issues and 
technologies.  
* Hours should be read as follows: n lecture hours – m laboratory hours per week 
 
All students must take a set of core computer science classes, which are augmented by 
specialization, or “track”, requirements. The security track mandates the following core 
courses: Introduction to Information Assurance: Computer Security; Information Assurance: 
Secure Management of Systems; Network Security; Secure Systems; and Security Policies, 
Models and Formal Methods. Each student can then select three electives to complete their 
course of study.  Certain scholarship programs supported by the Security Track require 
additional courses, such as Database Security and Advanced Topics in Computer Security. 
Our university requires that every Masters student write a thesis based upon research 
conducted during the final year of his or her studies.  Each thesis is supervised by one or 
more members of the faculty and affords students an opportunity to participate in one of the 
many ongoing research projects within the department.  Often students will select electives 
that enhance their ability to conduct the thesis research.  Often students will enroll in courses 
outside of the security track and even outside of the department.   
Doctoral students are not required to take a specific set of track courses, but must pass a 
set of three qualifying examinations: one on the formal foundations of computer science, and 
two others chosen from among the specializations of the department.  One of these is an 
examination in information assurance.  All doctoral students take, as a minimum, Network 
Security; Secure Systems; and Security Policies, Models and Formal Methods. 
From the preceding discussion, it clear that Secure Systems is a key course for both 
Masters and Ph.D. students [14].  The course has been taught for over seven years at our 
university and has evolved over that period. Its principled-based foundations remain constant, 
however its laboratory activities have evolved.  
1.2 Previous Secure Systems Laboratory Exercises 
As seen in Table 1, each security track course has both lecture and laboratory hours. 
Laboratory activities may involve short tutorial-style exercises, examination of case studies, 
weekly projects, or longitudinal projects.  These hands-on activities may be used to reinforce 
concepts covered in class, but in some cases they are employed to convey ideas that cannot 
be learned through lectures alone [11]. It is the premise of the laboratory exercises for Secure 
Systems that there are concepts that cannot be internalized without actually doing them. 
For many years the laboratory exercise taught in Secure Systems involved a Flaw 
Hypothesis Methodology (FHM) [15] [19] study of  an existing system.  Systems examined 
included Windows NT, Windows CE, Linux, and OpenBSD.  None were chosen because 
they offered superior security, but rather because they were in mainstream use. Students were 
organized in teams where each student had both an analytical and an operational role. For the 
analytical roles, each student would learn as much as possible about an assigned subsystem of 
the operating system. The operational roles included responsibilities such as System 
Administrator, Flaw Hypothesis Database Manager, Programmer, Project Leader, etc. 
Students were assessed in three areas: collective results of the team, analytical role and 
operational role.  This was made possible through the project product: a Flaw Hypothesis 
Methodology Report.  Students were required to create a single coherent report, but each 
student had to contribute sections describing the results of the subsystem analysis as well as 
how the operational role was fulfilled. 
Despite the fact that the students enjoyed the project, they found it to be rather 
overwhelming. They were required to learn a lot about a very large operating system in a 
very short time, and only then were they able to conduct their flaw hypothesis study.  
Another cause of frustration occurred when proprietary operating systems were used.  In 
these cases, students felt as if they were poking at a black box.  When  open source systems 
were used, the students felt compelled to study voluminous source code listings. Note that a 
professional Flaw Hypothesis team undertaking an analysis as part of an operating system 
evaluation would have the following: lots of experience in operating systems, experience in 
the FHM, full system documentation, and plenty of time.  The students had little experience 
and little time. 
The MINIX operating system was not selected as a target for the flaw hypothesis study, 
because it is intended a system for the study of operating system construction by students. 
Those chosen for the Flaw Hypothesis work were selected because they were mainstream 
operational systems rather than study pieces.  However, MINIX is a very appropriate target 
for student enhancements. 
Since the principle objective of Secure Systems is to teach the concepts of constructive 
security [12], a laboratory project based upon the construction of a small security 
enhancement to an existing operating system was designed.  Students would use a high 
assurance development methodology for the enhancement and, thus, would become familiar 
with the checks and balances required to construct a system when one of the developmental 
threats is subversion. Because students were studying MINIX in a prerequisite operating 
systems course, it became the logical target for the high assurance security enhancements. 
2. A New Secure Systems Laboratory project 
To frame the project, the Reference Monitor Concept was used as the guiding principle 
for secure systems design.  The MINIX operating system was chosen to be the target 
operating system for the project and Common Criteria [5] assurance requirements were used 
as requirements for the development process.  Each will be discussed in greater detail. 
2.1 Reference Monitor Framework 
This section is intended to provide a brief overview of the Reference Monitor Concept as 
a motivating element for the course and accompanying laboratory activity.  
The Reference Monitor Concept [2] is a powerful tool for defining and assessing system 
security properties.  It has three requirements: 
First, the access mediation mechanism is always invoked so that every access is 
mediated. If this were not the case, then it would be possible for an entity to bypass the 
mechanism and violate the policy that must be enforced. 
Second, the access mediation mechanism is tamperproof. In the model, it is impossible 
for an attacker to penetrate the protection mechanism such that the required access checks are 
not performed with a consequent failure to enforce the security policy allocated to the 
mechanism. 
Third it must be understandable.   Understandability permits the mechanism to be 
examined so that confidence is established in its ability to meet the first two requirements.  In 
general, understandability is enhanced through the minimization of unnecessary complexity 
and through a careful design process. 
To date, the Reference Monitor Concept is the only effective paradigm we know of for 
describing the abstract requirements of secure system design and implementation. No viable 
alternative has been introduced and it has proven effective under close scrutiny. In light of 
the fact that many vendors do not elect to take a constructive approach to the design and 
implementation of secure systems, it may be more important than ever to ensure that students 
understand how the constructive security guided by the reference monitor can be applied 
across a broad range of systems, while providing an analytical approach to systems that 
draws from many disciplines: programming languages, software engineering, computer 
engineering, operating systems, networks, etc. [10] 
2.2 MINIX 
It is very useful for students to examine and work with a real operating system in an 
operating systems course.  In the early days of UNIX, it was available and used by many 
universities. To fill the void created when AT&T withdrew UNIX as an available, living 
example of operating system source code, Tannenbaum wrote a pedagogical operating 
system that presented a UNIX-compatible interface and made it available to the academic 
community [18].  It is a small, modular operating system. Over the years, Tannebaum has 
resisted pressures to add features to MINX and it remains a simple operating system intended 
as an educational tool.  In contrast, LINUX has evolved into a major operating system with a 
vast feature set [3]. 
MINIX provides interface functions for process management, synchronization, file 
management, directory and file system management, and time management.  Its protection 
functions allow the user to manage the protection attributes of files and directories, 
presenting the UNIX-like semantics of read/write/execute protection bits. The source code 
listing is under 28,000 lines and includes numerous in-line comments.  Other than the 
protection bits, MINIX offers little in the way of protection features.  It does use protected 
mode and has protection bits on files, but, for the most part, security has not been given high 
importance. (Less than 20 pages is devoted to security in Tannenbaum and Woodhull [18] ) 
At our university, MINIX is used in the operating systems class that is a prerequisite to 
the secure systems class.  This made it a natural choice for student-devised security 
improvements. 
2.3 Common Criteria 
The Common Criteria [5][6][7] is an international standard used as the basis for the 
evaluation of the security properties of information technology products and systems.  It 
permits independent security assessments to be conducted on these products and systems so 
that consumers can have assurance that security requirements have been met.  This enables 
consumers to select products and systems based upon unbiased evidence rather than vendor 
claims.  
Security requirements for a Target of Evaluation (TOE) can include confidentiality, 
integrity and availability and are expressed in an implementation-independent Protection 
Profile and in an system-dependent Security Target.  The functional and assurance 
requirements are derived from Parts 2 and 3 of the Common Criteria. 
Because MINIX has not been constructed to meet a protection profile or security target 
and since it would be impossible in an eleven-week class to somehow transform it into a high 
assurance product, we focus instead upon the assurance of the security extension. 
Assurance requirements are categorized into classes and families and are briefly depicted 
in Table 2. The first column is the name of the assurance class, and the second column is the 
assurance family within that class. (The interested reader is referred to Section 2.6, Part 3 of 
the Common Criteria for an overview of the assurance classes and families.) The third and 
fourth columns give the component and a brief description for Evaluation Assurance Level 
(EAL) 6. The requirement levied EAL 6 is given along with an indicator of the applicability 
of the requirement to the class project.  Sometimes a requirement depends upon the security 
enhancement being implemented. For example, in the case of guidance documents, students 
are required to provide documentation only if the project results in new interfaces for the 
users or administrators of the system. This is indicated by P (possibly), while other 
requirements are indicated by Y (yes) or N (no). 
Table 2. Common Criteria Assurance Classes and Families required for the laboratory project 




Component Title EAL6 Project 
CM automation ACM_AUT.2  Complete CM automation 2 Y 




CM scope ACM_SCP.3 Development tools CM 
Coverage 
3 Y 
Delivery ADO_DEL.2 Detection of  modification 2 N ADO: Delivery 
and Operation Installation, generation, 
and start-up 
ADO_IGS.1 Installation, generation and 
start-up procedures 
1 N 
Functional Specification ADV_FSP.3 Semiformal functional 
specification 
3 Y 





ADV_IMP.3 Structured implementation of 
the TSF 
3 Y 
TSF Internals ADV_INT.2 Reduction of complexity 2 Y 
Low-level design ADV_LLD.2 Semiformal low-level design 2 Y 
Representation 
correspondence 





Security policy modeling ADV_SPM.3 Formal TOE security policy 
model 
3 N 
Administrator guidance AGD_ADM.1 Administrator guidance 1 P AGD: Guidance 
Documents User guidance AGD_USR.1 User guidance 1 P 
Development Security ALC_DVS.2 Sufficiency of security 
measures 
2 Y 
Flaw remediation ALC_FLR Not applicable (n/a) n/a N 
Life cycle definition ALC_LCD.2 Standardized life-cycle model 2 Y 
ALC: Life cycle 
support 
Tools and Techniques ALC_TAT.3 Compliance with 
implementation Standards – all 
parts 
3 Y 




Component Title EAL6 Project 
Coverage ATE_COV.3 Rigorous analysis of coverage 3 Y 
Depth ATE_DPT.2 Testing: low-level design 2 Y 
Functional Tests ATE_FUN.2 Ordered functional testing 2 Y 
ATE: Tests 
Independent Testing ATE_IND.2 Independent testing-sample 2 N 
Covert channel Analysis AVA_CCA.2 Systematic covert channel 
analysis 
2 N 
Misuse AVA_MSU.3 Analysis and testing for 
insecure states 
3 N 
Strength of TOE security 
functions 






Vulnerability analysis AVA_VLA.4 Highly resistance 4 N 
3. Laboratory Project Objectives 
So that we would be able to assess the success of the project, a set of high-level 
objectives was formulated. 
3.1 Understand concepts of high assurance development 
The assurance requirements of the Common Criteria provide the basis for the 
development methodology used by the students. Although students may have taken courses 
in software methodology and software engineering, they have never applied and augmented 
these processes to thwart a malicious insider intent on system subversion [1]. Using a 
subversion opportunity analysis [16] as guidance, students can better understand how each 
element in the high assurance security engineering process is both necessary and sufficient 
for the development of an evaluatable product. 
As part of the class a number of papers pertinent to high assurance development are 
studied. Several are particularly relevant to the project. For example, Dijkstra’s paper on the 
THE Operating System [8] describes the analysis required to ensure that a system is 
hierarchically layered and tested for correctness. The use of modularity and data hiding as 
described by Parnas [17] must be applied to the design and implementation of the 
enhancement. While developing their security enhancement, students obtain a better 
appreciation the concepts presented in these and other papers. 
3.2 Teamwork and Leadership 
Too often, university students are tasked with individual projects. In the development of 
real software and systems, individual genius is rarely the paradigm. Instead teams are 
organized to develop the product or system.  Clearly, if the team consists of bright 
individuals, the results may be highly innovative and well constructed, but a product 
developed by a loner is a rarity. Unfortunately, the lack of team building projects in computer 
science combined with the rather introverted nature of most computer science students results 
in serious acculturation problems following graduation. Therefore, an objective of the project 
is to force the students to work together as a team.  The project is large enough that it 
impossible for a single student, who is also enrolled in several other classes, to succeed 
single-handed. 
Members of the team have various responsibilities.  One of the more important roles is 
that of team leader.  Because our university has students with leadership skills, team leaders 
emerge naturally. A good team leader can provide a role model to the less experienced 
students who can observe how a leader helps the members achieve their goals through project 
management and social skills.  The team leaders are not experienced in software project 
management, so they learn how to harness the talents of their diverse team members to bring 
the effort to a successful conclusion. 
3.3 Ancillary Objectives 
A tangential objective of the project is that students obtain a more detailed appreciation 
of the structure of an operating system. Their previous experience with MINIX combined 
with their work on the security enhancement significantly increases their comfort level with 
respect to operating systems. 
Another objective of the project is to reinforce the students understanding of the 
Common Criteria. As graduates of a security program, they may be called upon to compare 
systems that lack Common Criteria Evaluations with systems that have been evaluated.  The 
experience of the Secure Systems project allows them to appreciate the requirements of the 
Evaluation Assurance Levels and the contexts in which security benefits gained at the higher 
assurance levels are applicable. 
4. Exercise Organization 
Careful organization is required to ensure that the projects are feasible within the 
academic quarter. 
4.1 Schedule 
Secure Systems is an eleven-week course, so an aggressive schedule is necessary to 
ensure that the students have sufficient time to complete their tasks.  During the first week of 
class, teams are organized and students are familiarized with the types of documentation 
required for their secure development methodologies.  This means that, although student 
teams might not have identified the specific security enhancement they want to implement for 
MINIX, they are able to start work on the development documents and procedures.  By the 
third week of class, teams have identified their proposed security enhancements. 
Completed projects are ready for presentation in class and peer evaluation by the end of 
the eighth week.  Peer evaluations are completed at the end of the ninth week, thus providing 
each team with two weeks to implement final improvements to the project. 
4.2 Expected Products 
Each team is required to select an enhancement to MINIX and then create a high 
assurance development framework in order to implement that enhancement.  A project report 
created by the team is the product.  Each student is expected to play several roles on the team.  
For example, a student might serve as the team’s system administrator and might also be the 
author of the software development standards. Both aspects of the student’s contribution must 
appear in the report. 
The report should contain descriptions of the configuration management plan, life cycle 
management plan, coding standards, minutes of meetings, design documentation, code, 
configuration control board decisions, test plans, test results, and considerable other pertinent 
documentation.  Students are expected to make a presentation of their work in class 
approximately three weeks before the end of the course.  At that time, their work is turned 
over to one of the other teams, who assume the role of evaluators. 
The evaluators are expected to produce a short report on the project, copies of which are 
made available both to the developers of the security enhancement and to the instructor.  The 
“evaluation report” is due two weeks before the end of the course, thus allowing each team an 
opportunity to make changes to their project prior to submitting it to the instructor.  The 
evaluation report is constructed by comparing the Common Criteria requirements with the 
project report. 
4.3 Team Composition, Assets and Motivators 
Students taking the secure systems course are quite diverse.  Most classes have several 
scholarship students, a number of young students who entered the Masters program 
immediately upon receiving their undergraduate degrees in computer science, and more 
mature students. The majority of the more mature students, who are generally between eight 
and ten years past receiving their undergraduate degrees, have some leadership experience.  
Among the more experienced students, there are usually several foreign students. 
To ensure that teams do not become enclaves of one type of student, for example only 
scholarship students or only students for whom English is their second language, constraints 
are made on team formation.  On the first day of class a roster is handed around that includes 
a few questions to be answered by each student.  For example, students are asked how many 
years it has been since their undergraduate degree and if English is the language with which 
they are most comfortable. 
The answers to these questions become the basis for team formation constraints, which 
are announced at the start of the next class. In the most recent offering of the course, each 
team was required to have no more than one of the very youngest students, at least one 
scholarship student, and at least one experienced, mature student.  This balance ensured that 
teams had the combination of the high energy of youth and the wisdom of experience, where 
the latter would ensure that the team would not wait until the day before a milestone to start 
work on the current phase of the project. 
The project requires the use of a variety of systems.  Students are encouraged not to use 
the same platform for their target system and for their configuration management system.  
Most of the students in the course have their own computers.  In addition, our university 
provides general computing support, with many applications for project management and 
document production.  
A few years ago, our department acquired approximately twenty laptops that faculty can 
reserve for the use of students taking a specific class. To ensure that the students have target 
systems for the enhanced versions of MINIX, a minimum of one laptop per team is reserved. 
As a motivator for excellence in the project, each class is informed that the team with the 
best overall project will be given a half a letter grade bonus.  Since this course involves a 
number of difficult exams and other challenging assignments, the students earnestly pursue 
this motivator. 
4.4 Student Assessment 
In a team project it is important to know the roles assigned to each team member and to 
devise a way so that each student can be judged for his or her individual contributions to the 
team effort.  Fortunately high assurance development calls for the creation of a number of 
documents as well as a number of roles.  The team had to come to a consensus regarding the 
roles to be assumed by each student and the documents each student was responsible for 
writing.  When the final project report is turned in, students must describe their contributions 
in two major areas: documents created and team responsibilities. 
Grading consisted of the following elements, described in Table 3. 






Overall Project 30 The quality of the overall team effort was graded. 
Documents 
Created  
30 To create a methodology for high assurance development, each team 
had to develop a number of documents.  Each student wrote one or 
more of these documents for the team.  
Team 
Responsibilities 
30 These responsibilities related to the role(s) assumed by the student and 
how well they were performed. The description of the activities 
associated in the role documented in the final report were used in the 
evaluation. 
Team Feedback 10 Feedback from team members constituted the final portion of the 
assessment.  
 
For the instructor, grading the projects has been arduous.  Of course, the students have an 
opportunity to demonstrate the functionality their security enhancement, but since this is not 
the point of the exercise, the instructor faces a considerable amount of paperwork.    Each 
project report has been over 100 pages long. 
5. Discussion 
Despite the challenge associated with creating a high assurance development 
environment in a rather short time, feedback from students has been positive.  The rather 
short time frame makes the project very difficult, so the project might be easier at universities 
on a semester rather than a quarter schedule. 
5.1 Results 
Our objective was to instill in the students an appreciation of the processes necessary to 
provide assurance that subversion of their deliberately small enhancement to MINIX did not 
occur.  Students have been able to create effective and successful development frameworks.  
Minimization of the scope of the security enhancements is essential for the success of the 
projects.  
5.2 Problems 
Problems are inevitable in any project-oriented undertaking.  Below, several of the major 
difficulties encountered in the exercise are discussed. 
5.3 Students Drop Course 
Because each team member has specific responsibilities with respect to the project, 
serious problems can occur if a student drops the course.  Due to the number of roles 
involved, a minimum acceptable team size of four is necessary.  To avoid these problems, 
students are polled at the beginning of the class to determine if there is anyone in the class 
who does not want to be there.  Then the teams can be organized in anticipation of a student 
drop. 
On a few occasions, unforeseen circumstances resulted in withdrawal of a student from 
the class.  If this draws the team size down to four, no large-scale reorganization was 
required; however, if the membership of the team goes below four, drastic steps are taken: 
each remaining team member is reassigned to another team, where small teams were chosen 
preferentially. 
5.4 Non-contributing Team Members 
Occasionally a team will have a member who is a laggard. Discussions with the 
instructor regarding team progress allow both the team leader and the instructor to seek ways 
to solve the problem.  Team feedback forms allow team members to  indicate team members 
who are not contributing adequately, but in a team effort this does not help get the job done. 
In such cases, the instructor and the project leader can come to an agreement that, if the 
laggard team member does not make the required contribution, the rest of the team would not 
be penalized.  Fortunately, such dire circumstances have not occurred, but they clearly need 
to be considered when developing team projects. 
5.5 Project Scope 
One team proposed construction of an encrypting file system for MINIX.  Although a 
major security improvement to the existing MINIX system, it was clearly too large: the 
students would not have been able to complete the project by the end of the class. The 
instructor must be alert to over ambitious programming projects because at the outset of the 
project, students are unaware of the amount of effort required to construct a high assurance 
development environment. Had the objective of the course been extensive practice in system-
level design and implementation, then a large project might have been appropriate.  In this 
case the process was deemed more important than what was to be built. 
5.6 Comparison with Other Work 
Du [9] has developed a version of MINIX called SMINIX intended for use in teaching 
security mechanisms in operating systems. MINIX was enhanced by the faculty to include 
the following security features: authentication, access control lists, label-based access control, 
capabilities, sandboxing, a Secure file system, and privilege mechanisms.  Once SMINIX 
was constructed, the interfaces to the new security features were left in place, but the 
mechanisms were turned into stubs.  In a sequence of laboratory activities of increasing 
difficulty, students must implement the mechanism while remaining faithful to the module 
interface. 
Although this approach teaches students details of the security mechanisms, they do not 
learn about the development processes required to achieve assurance.  In addition, teamwork 
is not emphasized; the projects can be completed individual students. 
Nachos [4] is a popular framework for providing experience in operating system 
development, however, it does not emphasize security and its use does not necessarily result 
in practical experience in either assurance or security mechanisms.  
Our project is intended to teach the process of high assurance software and system 
development in the context of an international standard for secure system evaluation, rather 
than the particulars of specific security mechanisms. Both SMINIX and Nachos could be 
adapted to our teaching objectives. Combined with its emphasis on teamwork, these factors 
differentiate our laboratory project from the usual system enhancement activities used in 
many operating system classes. 
5.7 Future Work 
Our research group is currently in the process of developing a high assurance example of 
trusted computing [13].  The project consists of four related activities: creation of a 
framework for the rapid development of high assurance systems, development of a reference-
implementation trusted computing component; evaluation of the component for high 
assurance; and open dissemination of the results related to the first three activities. 
As this project progresses, we intend to use the reference-implementation trusted 
computing component as the basis for the Secure Systems laboratory work instead of MINIX.  
Then, instead of making improvements to a patently insecure, low assurance system, the 
students will be charged with the development of an enhancement to an existing high 
assurance system.  The scope of the programming effort is expected to increase along with a 
change in the balance between the creation of procedures and standards, and design and 
implementation evidence. 
In summary, this project has been useful in that it gives students practical insight into the 
complexity of the high assurance development process and allows them to work as a team to 
develop a rudimentary, but workable, high assurance development framework. 
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